After The Storm by Reginald Wilkinson 1

[Admin]

Accompanied by the deafening sounds of gunfire, SWAT teams and national guard troops swarm the massive grey stone walls of the prison, overwhelming the bad guys and saving the hostages - crisis over, movie ends - roll credits.

Corrections professionals know that, unlike movie portrayals, disturbances are most often resolved through patient negotiation and inter-agency cooperation. We also know that the end of a riot does not signal the end of upheaval. In fact, repercussions and adjustments reverberate far into the future.

On Easter Sunday, 1993, inmates returning to L-block from recreation at the maximum security Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) in rural Lucasville assaulted the entry officer. Minutes later, L-block was overrun, and the longest prison siege in U.S. history where lives were lost was underway. Eleven days later the riot ended. Correctional Officer Robert Vallandingham and nine inmates had been murdered. Thirteen correctional officers had been taken hostage. Five were held for the duration of the disturbance. L-block was virtually destroyed.

As the two hundred-plus media reporters packed up their cameras and satellite dishes, Ohioans breathed a sigh of relief that the carnage was over. But for the eleven thousand (now thirteen thousand) employees of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC), the end of the riot signaled fundamental changes at every level of the operation.

The Immediate Aftermath

The aftermath actually began near the beginning of the riot. As early as Day Two, we realized the need to manage the inevitable factors of the aftermath. The National Institute of Corrections (NIC) was contacted to retain the services of an objective observer. Lance Newsome, formerly of the Georgia Department of Corrections and NIC consultant, arrived to observe the eventual surrender and to provide a visible presence to prevent retaliation. During the days leading up to the surrender, Newsome assisted in the management of neighboring K-block and in the transportation of inmates out of SOCF.

Central office staff kept key officials and stakeholders updated throughout the disturbance. Accurate records and logs were maintained, and a committee was formed to investigate what triggered the riot.

Even before the rioting inmates surrendered, a process was put in place for the orderly evacuation of L-block. Inmate riot organizers toured the gym where the Ohio State Highway Patrol had set up tables for first aid, identification and separation of rival groups. Transportation to other state prisons had been arranged. Flexible plastic handcuffs were delivered to L-block to control predatory prisoners.

The evacuation process took five hours. Hostages, dressed in prison blues, were released in the midst of inmate groups. After being identified, the hostages were whisked to the prison infirmary for initial treatment. As they were escorted through the long prison hallways, tears were shed and ovations resounded from the two thousand-plus individuals who had worked and prayed for their release. The freed hostages were then transported to a local hospital for private reunions with their families.

In their article Resolution of Prison Riots1, published in the National Institute of Justice’s Research in Brief (October, 1995), Bert Useem, Camille Graham Camp, George M. Camp and Renie Dugan state that, "After the inmates surrender, commanders must coordinate a search for contraband, move inmates to secure units, conduct damage assessments, and ensure that all inmates are accounted for. Medical care must be provided to injured hostages and inmates. Evidence must be collected for future prosecutions....The importance of performing these tasks cannot be overstated. Having resolved the riot, the temptation to lower vigilance and assume that the worst is over may be premature."

With recent prison flare-ups, particularly the Camp Hill disturbances, firmly in mind, incident commanders were determined to conduct an orderly, secure transition to a "new normal." We were fortunate to have on hand a wide variety of specialists during and after the riot. Their expertise, combined with our own foresight and common sense, led us through the incredible maze that comprised the aftermath. State Patrol investigators secured L-block and began an investigation of what was soon to be known as the largest crime scene in Ohio history.

Leadership

From the outset, Ohio Governor George V. Voinovich and then Lt. Governor (now U.S. Senator) Mike DeWine provided ever-present support and leadership. The Governor’s primary mission was the preservation of life. A visit to Central Office by the Governor during the dreadful middle days, when negotiations were stalled and rumors of atrocities abounded, was genuinely appreciated. During the eleven days, Lt. Governor DeWine helped make sure the Department had all the resources it needed to get the job done. As a former prosecutor, DeWine was keenly aware of the complexities of the criminal trials that were sure to ensue, and as soon as the riot ended DeWine was in L-block, ensuring the integrity of the crime scene.

It is impossible to name the many agencies and individuals who contributed to the riot’s final outcome. The following is a list of the most obvious:

Staff from the Ohio Department of Mental Health and others counseled staff and hostage family members during and after the riot.
The Governor activated the Ohio National Guard who provided perimeter security, earth moving equipment to probe for tunnels, and an inmate family information telephone line. The Guard was also prepared to assist in any assault on L-block and provide subsequent medical triage.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided hostage taker profilers to assist the negotiation team. Twenty-five other agents assisted in setting up the Command Center and installed state-of-the-art detection and monitoring devices which later proved invaluable in convicting riot leaders.
City of Dayton Police and State Patrol hostage negotiators advised DRC negotiators.
The Ohio Emergency Management Agency (EMA) was activated by the Governor and served as a liaison to secure resources from state and federal agencies. The local EMA was on hand throughout the disturbance, ready to assist in any capacity.
Attorneys from the Ohio Attorney General’s office assisted DRC attorneys in managing legal aspects of the disturbance. (We realized later that we should have had a representative from the prosecutor’s office collecting evidence and advising us on-site during the riot.)
The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the crash of a State Patrol helicopter. (There were no serious injuries).
Local law enforcement and emergency agencies provided initial perimeter security and subsequent assistance to the families of the hostages who were located in a high school across the street from the prison.
Teams of union members (AFSCME/OCSEA) dedicated themselves to the care and comfort of the hostages’ family members, bringing food and information, and protecting them from prying media.
While much has been written about the Easter riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, and this article is intended to analyze the aftermath, it is impossible to discuss the aftermath without a brief look at the crucial roles played by DRC staff. Their efforts during the riot were later reflected in vital debriefings, reports and analyses of the process. DRC staff were on hand both at SOCF and throughout the state to support the effort. Special teams included:

Hostage Negotiation Teams
Disturbance Control Teams
Tactical Response Teams
Sniper Teams
Public Information Teams
Union Representatives
Other DRC staff assumed special roles such as Command Center coordination, assistance to the hostage families, inmate transportation, housekeeping and kitchen duties.

Lockdown

The prison remained on lockdown throughout the disturbance. Following the surrender, 130 prisoners were transferred to other institutions, and one thousand remained. The lockdown presented pressing challenges and questions:

Which of the remaining prisoners were active participants in the riot? Which prisoners presented a danger to others, both in terms of retaliation for crimes committed in L-block and in silencing potential witnesses? These questions were difficult to answer because Department staff were precluded from interviewing inmates in deference to the State Patrol investigation already underway.
Many staff were traumatized by events of the eleven-day siege. The safety of the environment and prevention of retaliation was a real and immediate concern.
The destruction of L-block eliminated forty percent of Lucasville’s cells from use. Chronic crowding system-wide limited alternative high security beds. Consequently, options for the segregation of problem prisoners from each other were severely limited.
The decision was made to retain the entire inmate population at Lucasville in lockdown status. During this period, inmates spent an average of twenty-three hours a day in their cells, released only occasionally for showers, recreation, visits or investigatory and attorney interviews. Whenever possible, services such as sick call, meals, commissary and the like occurred within cellblock confines.

As the criminal investigation cleared individual prisoners from riot-related criminal liability, they were gradually released from lockdown and given program assignments. Prisoners not cleared remained in lockdown status until their criminal or administrative cases were resolved. Where culpability was established, assignment to long-term segregation status was the usual result. More than two years elapsed before the process was complete.

During that time a number of committees completed the process of redefining the operational procedures for the maximum security facility. The emphasis was on increased control of prisoner movement and limiting movement to first twenty, then forty inmates at a time. Job assignments and programming were redefined and further limited in scope. The retrofit of Lucasville is now finished. By the summer of 1996 the prison will be operating as a complete maximum security facility for the first time in three years.

Coordinating the Recovery

It was immediately apparent at the riot’s end that many types of expertise were required to assist in juggling the many balls involved in the aftermath.

The SOCF riot created many victims including staff, prisoners, family members and friends. The most obvious victims were the hostages, several who were severely beaten, as well as the five who were kept bound and blindfolded for the entire eleven days. The Department provided immediate counseling for the hostages and their families that continues to this day. A team from the DRC Office of Personnel helped cut through red tape to ensure prompt medical and psychological care. As the hostages began to recover, DRC elicited assistance from other state agencies in securing employment for those who did not wish to return to the prison. Of the thirteen officers held hostage only two, Officers Mike Hensley and Darrold Clark, returned to SOCF. Former hostage Larry Dotson is teaching new recruits at Ohio’s Corrections Training Academy.

Many staff on-site during the riot welcomed counseling offered by the various mental health care providers. DRC medical and counseling service providers attended to inmates who suffered during the siege.

Other staff were profoundly affected. Special attention was given to the hostage negotiators, members of the public information and tactical teams and SOCF management who assumed responsibility for elements of the tragedy. Symptoms of stress continue to have an impact in the months and years following the riot.

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Governor Voinovich, Lt. Governor DeWine, DRC managers and others made public announcements of concern for the hostages, support for the way the riot was handled, appreciation for DRC staff and wishes for the agency’s complete recovery.

The DRC, a proud and confident agency, used the tragedy at SOCF as an agent for change. The sting caused by the temporary loss of control at SOCF served as a catalyst to inspire the agency to become the very best in the business of riot prevention. Failure was not an option. Standing at a precipice, the Department was faced with the challenge of persevering through the interminable aftermath and emerging stronger. In keeping with the family spirit inherent in the Department, employees at all levels pitched in to help DRC become an agency defined by excellence.

Assistance From Inside and Out

As the extent of the riot became apparent the Department received assistance from many agencies. The state’s Division of Public Works assembled a team of architects and construction management specialists to assess structural damage to L-block. At the same time, DRC convened the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility Renovation Planning Committee to identify SOCF’s mission as a maximum security facility; identify and define the levels of supervision and delineate security operations at each level; establish the target number of inmates to be housed at each level; and determine other issues central to the operation of a maximum security unit which are necessary to develop a complete architectural program.

To repair the damage to L-block would have required five million dollars. It was decided instead to conduct a complete retrofit of SOCF, creating a new and "true" maximum security prison. The SOCF retrofit was to eventually consume over forty million dollars in construction, security upgrades, the creation of safe havens and the importation of improved technology.

Nearly a dozen committees and task forces, including the afore mentioned renovation committee, were established to evaluate the SOCF disturbance and make recommendations to improve security and efficiency department-wide. The following synopses outline the scope of each committee:

Governor’s Select Committee on Corrections - Governor Voinovich charged the Select Committee with conducting a comprehensive evaluation of all reports and information pertaining to the disturbance. Their stated mission was "to examine the philosophy, policies and practices of the DRC and to make recommendations germane to preventing institutional violence and to make our institutions safer and less stressful for all." Dr. Simon Dinitz, an Ohio State University sociology professor emeritus and internationally renowned criminologist, was tapped by Governor Voinovich to head up the Select Committee.
Disturbance Cause Committee - This group, appointed by the DRC, was directed to identify factors that caused, contributed to or triggered the disturbance. The committee interviewed staff and examined the environment, management systems, policies, staff interaction and inmate demands and complaints. Parts of this report were used as a reference in the implementation of new policies and procedures.
Initial Hours Chronology Committee - This DRC committee’s charge was to document events immediately leading up to the riot on Easter Sunday, focusing on the hours of 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.
SOCF Delivery of Basic Services Committee - Following the disturbance, SOCF remained on lockdown status, severely limiting inmate movement. Tensions between staff and inmates remained high. SOCF Warden Arthur Tate, Jr. assembled a cross section of staff, including bargaining unit members, to plan for the eventual easing of the lockdown while maintaining safety and security.
SOCF Disturbance Follow-up Committee - The DRC follow-up committee was appointed to monitor the problem-solving process in the riot’s aftermath. The committee reviewed report findings and recommended action plans to address concerns and issues.
Correctional Institution Inspection Committee - The CIIC is an on-going legislative committee focusing on the DRC. The CIIC conducted a separate investigation of the riot as it related to the management of all Ohio prisons.
QStP (Quality Services through Partnership) Steering Committee - This DRC committee monitored the ways in which all employees could be informed and involved in decision making processes. QStP facilitates the establishment of focus and problem-solving groups, soliciting input from individuals at all levels of the agency. Union representatives are also included in planning committees statewide.
Lucasville Media Task Force Committee - The media proved to be an almost overwhelming presence during the disturbance, fanning rumors of atrocities and negatively influencing negotiations. This task force of reporters and editors was convened at the Governor’s request to make constructive recommendations on how the state could better handle crisis situations and the media.
Information generated from these sources and others was voluminous and became unwieldy. In order to document and track the hundreds of recommendations, a resource guide entitled "A Systems Approach to Corrections in Ohio" was developed. Each recommendation was assigned a number for tracking, a responsible party and was listed in the relevant chapter. The eight chapters are:
Security and Supervision
Inmate Services
Inmate Programming
Employee Relations
Parole and Community Services
Communication and Education
Fiscal/Audits
Committees -Synopses and Status
The "Systems Approach" document has been revised and updated, and is currently being prepared for inclusion as a major informational resource in the Department’s database.

The Investigation

Wearing protective biohazard suits, State Patrol investigators approached the 8-acre crime scene with a combination of apprehension and determination. In a letter to SOCF staff, State Patrol Sgt. H.W. "Howie" Hudson, a member of the team from the beginning, remembered entering the block. "On April 22, 1993, as I walked, for the first time, through the rubble that was once L-block, I thought to myself, ‘We’ll just have to do the best we can.’ I never imagined the success we would achieve. This success could not have been possible without you." Hudson went on to thank the SOCF administrative staff, record office, transportation teams and, especially, the former hostages. "I can’t say enough about those of you who have testified during the trials. Many of you have spent hours and hours on the witness stand re-living what I’m sure were the worst moments of your lives. You, more than anyone else, are responsible for our tremendous success at trial."

The investigation, working out of a base in the SOCF school, resulted in reams of information. Twenty troopers began the process, with four remaining three years later. Over 1,250 interviews were conducted. Investigators received on-the-job training from FBI forensics experts - including some of the same agents who had searched the rubble of the World Trade Center after it was bombed. More than four thousand items were tagged as evidence. A special computer program using over one thousand megs of memory was developed to store and retrieve data on crime witnesses, locations and events. The safety of prisoners who testified against others was ensured by the creation of special housing units and computerized separation programs. Inmates were housed in seventeen different institutions.

The SOCF Trials and Disciplinary Procedure

Soon after SOCF Special Prosecutor Mark Piepmeier and his staff were named, a strong spirit of cooperation was developed among the prosecutors, DRC staff and the State Patrol. Piepmeier was recently quoted in the Cincinnati Post as saying that the key to winning convictions was eroding the loyalty and fear inmates felt toward their gangs. To do that, his staff targeted a few gang leaders and convinced them to accept plea bargains. Thirteen months into the investigation, a primary riot provocateur agreed to talk about Officer Vallandingham’s death. He later received a sentence of seven to twenty-five years after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit murder. His testimony led to death sentences for riot leaders Carlos Sanders, Jason Robb, George Skatzes and James Were. After that, fellow gang members began to seek deals of their own. "It took us a long time to understand the mentality of the inmates," Piepmeier said in the Post article. "These guys could mislead and manipulate us, but we had to keep our word (of safety) to them. If we didn’t, no one would talk to us." Staff were assigned to trial logistics, guaranteeing that witnesses were in the right place at the right time, and protected from each other. Local jails were used to ensure security and protection. The multi-agency investigation resulted in:

550 inmates cleared of involvement
152 indictments involving fifty inmates - eleven cases relating to Officer Vallandingham
Fifty trials in ten counties
Forty-seven guilty findings or guilty pleas
Two not guilty findings - one hung jury
Using information provided by the State Patrol and Special Prosecutor, the Department divided prisoners into two groups - those to be criminally charged, and those who would receive administrative disciplinary hearings for other offenses and infractions. The latter group was further divided into either "A" (offenses against persons) or "B" (offenses against property). Inmates on the "B" list were released from lockdown status. A DRC investigative committee then reviewed pertinent information and re-interviewed crucial witnesses. The Department augmented its existing disciplinary process with objective parties who assisted in reviewing the conduct reports and observed the Rules Infraction Board (internal due process) hearings. Eighteen inmates were found guilty, and six were acquitted. Guilty findings resulted in assignment to segregation cells, classification to higher security and a report to the Parole Board.

In his final report, consultant Vince Nathan (see below) praised the Department. "... all interested parties have achieved the objectives they sought .... RIB panels have afforded the benefit of procedural and substantive due process to prisoners charged with offenses that evoke strong emotional responses from DRC staff. Outcomes ... not only have been procedurally correct, they have been fair."

To help effect a surrender, the Department had asked Cleveland attorney and inmate advocate Niki Schwartz to assist the rioting inmates in developing their conditions of surrender. These conditions came to be known as the "21-point" agreement. The Department was expressly committed to honoring the agreement and Schwartz remained actively involved in advocating for the rights of the affected inmates. At the same time, managers were sensitive to the potentially explosive relationships between staff and prisoners. The Department wanted to avoid staff exacting retribution. We recognized that while many inmates had committed egregious crimes, many were not involved, or had been victimized themselves. The Department retained attorney Vince Nathan, a nationally recognized Special Master and inmate rights advocate to monitor compliance. Nathan had been appointed Special Master to several correctional jurisdictions, including Ohio, New Mexico, Georgia, Michigan, Rhode Island, Texas and Puerto Rico. The scope of services required of Nathan were stated as follows:

To review and evaluate the status of the DRC’s implementation of the April 21, 1993 (21-Point) agreement;
To advise the Director of the DRC concerning steps that might be taken and mechanisms that might be implemented to achieve compliance with the agreement;
To identify problems of communication between staff and inmates and between staff and institutional and departmental officials and recommend mechanisms for improving communication among and between those groups, and;
To identify sources of tension among staff and inmates, and recommend mechanisms to ameliorate those tensions.
Achieving a Balance

While contracting with Mr. Nathan was perceived as counter-intuitive by some and controversial by others, we felt strongly that it was the right move. Nathan’s input proved to be extremely beneficial in the end.

In his final report, Nathan outlines several factors crucial to Ohio’s success in managing the aftermath and avoiding additional violence. A major point was that Department leadership remained in place following the riot and was committed to balancing the requirements of myriad stakeholders. Nathan wrote, "The consultant commends (staff) of the Department for the successful efforts they have made to put Ohio’s correctional system on an even keel following the horror of the riot at SOCF.... (they) have been faced with pressure from many directions: government officials, the Special Prosecutor, correctional union officials, families of hostages, inmates and their families, attorneys representing the L-block prisoners in civil litigation, Mr. Niki Schwartz, and the consultant to name the most obvious.

"Standing at the center of this storm of opinions and attitudes, (DRC staff) have faced a plethora of riot-related demands, while being required to manage a crowded and complex correctional system on a day-to-day basis....(they) have had to make tough calls, sometimes favoring one set of needs and desires and, at other times, recognizing another set. Above all, they have been required to address operational and policy issues resulting from the riot in a manner calculated to avoid further violence. This they have accomplished with singular effectiveness."

Lucasville’s Legacy

A prison riot fundamentally changes a correctional agency. Nothing has remained untouched by the events of April 1993. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction has worked diligently to overcome adversity, exceed the status quo and to reach a "new normal." The following are just some of the significant changes that have rippled throughout our agency:

DRC has made great strides in improving communication among staff, between agencies and with the public and legislators. The SOCF riot gave us a new perspective on the need to educate, inform and share information. Further, working on self-directed and problem-solving teams helps individuals realize the impact of decisions. Intelligence gathering has greatly improved through cooperation throughout the ranks and by optimizing the use of technology.
The SOCF riot highlighted for the Department, lawmakers and the public, unresolved problems such as security versus non-security staff alienation; mass inmate movement; recreation and the use of free weights; the influence of gangs; use of force issues; inmate religious, educational, recovery services, and medical and mental health issues; racial enmity and the effects of prison crowding.

Policies and procedures have been reviewed and strengthened, and new policies implemented.
Training has been considerably expanded and enhanced.
Union and management are working toward common goals.
A Strategic Threat Group (gang) management and intelligence gathering network has been expanded and become more consistent and sophisticated.
Maximum security inmates are now single-celled.
A new $60 million, 500-bed "supermax" facility to house predatory inmates is under construction.

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The Ohio legislature authorized the Department to hire 904 new corrections officers and funding is in place to hire an additional 1,500 staff, including two hundred C.O.s.
Ohio’s inmate to staff ratio has dropped from 8.7-to-1 in 1993 to 6.7-to-1 today.
Since 1993, eleven new prisons, work camps and dormitories have opened.
Greater attention is focused on "special needs" inmates such as those with mental illnesses. Mentally ill inmates are now housed and treated in special facilities and treatment units.
The legislature has provided more resources to the Department. Our biennium budget now exceeds one billion dollars.
Individual prison riot plans have been replaced with a system-wide Critical Incident Management (CIM) plan to ensure a consistent, rapid and forceful response to prison disturbances and disasters. CIM training has cascaded to all DRC staff.
Special Response Teams have replaced individual Disturbance Control Teams. Regional Special Tactical and Response (STAR) teams are in place to assist institutions in quelling disturbances. STAR teams also conduct institutional "Operation Clearout" shakedowns.
Ross Correctional Institution’s Hostage Negotiations instructor wrote in an article for the staff newsletter (April 1996): "Easter ... What a beautiful season it is. A time to celebrate life and all of its wonderful offerings. As we know, this too is a sad time of year. The tragedy at SOCF has been permanently etched in our minds. It has shown us how easily life can be taken. But it has shown us too, how precious life is. It has heightened our awareness and brought an urgency to the need for trained teams in each and every institution. As negotiators, we sadly but graciously use the tragedy at SOCF as a building block in our training sessions. The events at SOCF should be utilized in a positive manner that can educate us and inspire us each year."

A Stronger Network

As stated earlier, DRC has historically enjoyed an excellent relationship with the State Patrol. Our shared experience during and after the SOCF riot strengthened that bond. We also now conduct joint training exercises with the Patrol, National Guard and local law enforcement agencies.

We have worked with many Ohio state agencies in the development of an Incident Command System utilizing a state-of-the-art command center operated by Ohio’s Emergency Management Agency. Regardless of the nature of a crisis, whether it be a natural disaster, chemical spill or prison riot, all agencies will provide support, resources, expertise and manpower to affected areas.

Using DRC’s version of employee empowerment, "Ohio Quality Corrections," all aspects of prison construction, training, staffing, policies and procedures are planned and implemented with input from employees at all levels of the agency. As a result, DRC has fostered a solid sense of ownership and involvement system wide. With "excellence" as our byword, our employees have worked long and hard to make the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction the best it’s ever been.

The SOCF riot, and particularly our inability to prevent the murder of Officer Vallandingham or effect a quick hostage rescue, resulted in a loss of confidence throughout the Department. Our portrayal in the media was one of non-cooperation. Many of the things we had believed in disintegrated in the face of a true crisis.

The year bracketed by Easter 1993 and Easter 1994 was consumed almost entirely by riot-related issues, committees, investigations and reports. Many staff had trouble recalling what their jobs had entailed before they were pulled for new duties. However, the ensuing improvements enabled staff to become more knowledgeable about the agency and hold their jobs and the jobs of fellow employees in higher regard. Teamwork has been emphasized, helping employees realize the value of diversity and the improved results that are generated when a group of people work together toward a common goal. Leadership development has intensified and cross-training and mentoring are encouraged.

The Resolution of Prison Riots2 article concludes with the following: "Comprehensive planning based on awareness of other incidents and lessons learned from the past cannot prevent all prison riots. It can, however, help correctional administrators avoid some disturbances, take action to prevent the small incident from expanding into a full scale riot, limit the extent of damage of riots in progress, and terminate riot situations in the least costly way."

While Ohio has come a long way, there are no guarantees. "No one who’s in the business would dare predict a riot can’t happen again." Dr. Dinitz told the Cleveland Plain Dealer, "It’s a volatile mix. They couldn’t get along on the outside. Why would they get along on the inside? When you consider the mix, it’s a wonder there aren’t more riots." With Professor Dinitz’s caution in mind, Ohio’s corrections professionals stand ready to share our experiences and lessons learned with our colleagues.

Despite all our progress, it is important to note that the aftermath isn’t over. Perhaps it never will be. Three years later we are still in litigation with inmates and former hostages; the supermax prison, developed to help us separate predatory prisoners from the rest of us, is years from completion; we remain under the media and legislative microscope; and, our staff continue to heal.

There are things we choose not to forget. Each year in May, we gather to honor our friends and colleagues killed in the line of duty. The name "Bobby Vallandingham" is the newest, and in our hearts, the freshest wound. We close this article with a quote from this year’s memorial:

"We are here today because there are some griefs that are so great that they have to be shared. We are here today to remember our friends and colleagues who were killed in the line of duty. We are here today because the hand of tragedy has touched us all. All death is tragic. If it were not so, life itself would be meaningless. But life cut short is the most tragic of all.

There is no greater sacrifice than theirs. There is no way we can thank them enough for giving their all.

In death they leave behind all that they have - and take with them all that they are. To the families and loved ones gathered here today - we offer our gratitude and our sympathy. We offer our shoulders to help lighten the load.

No one is dead as long as there is someone to remember. Today we stand and remember. They were once ours - now they belong to the ages."


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References:

*U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Research in Brief, October, 1995. Bert Useem, Camille Graham Camp, George M. Camp, and Renie Dugan. "Resolution of Prison Riots."

Source: www.drc.state.oh.us/web/Articles/article3.htm